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Abstract
In this paper, we analyse the restructuring of debt in the presence of debt overhang. The firm
starts out with a debt liability and an investment opportunity. Then with unrestructured debt, the
firm maintains the current borrowing payments until default or investment. If the creditors allow the
parties to restructure the debt with exchange offers, then the borrowing payments change as well as
the default and investment points. We find that there is a unique optimal restructuring path which
maintains debt at positive levels but defers default indefinitely. This path is optimal regardless of
whether the debt holders or the firm control the process through superior bargaining power. More-
over, a debt-for-equity exchange to remove all existing debt takes place just before investment that
is followed by the issue of an optimal amount of new debt as part of the funding for the investment
cost. The optimal investment trigger is higher along the optimal restructuring path than it is for an
unlevered firm. We discuss the findings in the light of existing empirical evidence.
JEL numbers: G32; G33; G34
Keywords: Bargaining power; Debt forgiveness; Debt overhang; Debt restructuring; Exchange offers;
Growth opportunities.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we study the restructuring of debt for a firm with debt overhang. As pointed out by Myers
(1977), a debt overhang leads to underinvestment. The firm only services the debt payments in the region
where the potential earnings flow is sufficiently high. Therefore, the firm might default before making the
investment. Thus, changing the debt burden through debt restructuring can change both the timing of the
default and investment. Therefore, we create a scenario where one party makes debt-for-equity exchange
offers to reduce the debt burden, or equity-for-debt offers to increase the debt burden, that is accepted or
rejected by the other party. Our primary focus is to study such debt restructuring.
The model is substantially equivalent to Myers (1977) except set within a continuous time framework,
and furthermore the firm pays corporate taxes. The firm owns an investment opportunity as its only asset
and undertakes an obligation to pay a constant coupon flow indefinitely. The firm has deep pockets and
continues to inject cash to enable payments of the coupon flow until it is optimal to default, or it is optimal
to make the investment and harvest the earnings flow. The firm can borrow more at investment. However,
the option to make exchange offers to change the debt burden is valuable. The parties hold bargaining
power that is perfectly and unevenly distributed (either 100% to the firm and 0% to the debt holders or
the other way around). The party with the bargaining power can make exchange offers to the other party
in the form and at a time that is optimal. We ask two questions: How and when is the debt overhang
restructured? Is the debt restructuring process efficient?
The answer to the first question is that firms actively restructure debt in all non-distressed states of
nature through small debt-for-equity and equity-for-debt exchanges. The restructuring path is the same
whether the debt holder or the firm holds the bargaining power. Surprisingly, the firm maintains an optimal
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positive level of debt in all states before investment, but replaces all existing debt with new debt as part
of the investment process. Therefore, the firm defers the removal of debt in anticipation of investment
until the investment happens. Leverage is valuable before investment because of the tax advantage of
debt. However, to carry old debt over the investment threshold causes distortions to the timing of the
investment decision. Therefore, the firm makes a massive debt restructuring just before the investment
to remove these distortions. The firm immediately takes on new debt to acquire a new tax shield. The
answer to the second question is that the debt restructuring is efficient. Regardless of which party controls
the debt restructuring process through its bargaining power, the debt restructuring follows the same path
where the value of the firm is always maximised.
There are additional features to note. First, with optimal debt overhang, the investment trigger along
the optimal debt restructuring path is higher than the investment trigger for a corresponding unlevered
firm. A levered firm takes advantage of the debt tax shield before investment that an unlevered firm
cannot. Both firms choose the optimal leverage after investment. Increasing the investment trigger is
optimal for the levered firm to take advantage of the debt tax shield before investment. Second, the debt
restructuring path leads to a reduction in borrowing if the firm is close to default, which lowers the default
trigger to the point that default never happens. In existing optimal capital structure models, the option
to exercise limited liability tends to be more valuable than reducing the debt burden for the firm (see, e.g.,
Dangl and Zechner (2004)). In our model, the debt holder and the firm both have a stake in maximising
the value of the investment opportunity. Debt restructuring achieves this objective by deferring default
indefinitely. Post-investment, the situation changes as non-distressed debt restructuring is typically not
feasible. Instead, the parties engage in debt restructuring only in distressed states of nature.
This paper falls into the study of Coasian renegotiation of debt contracts, but the focus on debt overhang
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situations makes the results appear different from existing models in this area. The unconditional promise
of payment that firms imply by borrowing can lead to ex-post inefficient defaults. The literature predicts,
therefore, the renegotiation of distressed debt. For instance, the firm might choose to default on their debt
even if the liquidation value is less than the continuation value of the firm. In this case, debt restructuring
generates a bargaining surplus for both parties. Such an ex-post inefficient default has been the primary
focus of the debt restructuring theory such as in Hart and Moore (1998), Mella-Barral and Perraudin
(1997), and Mella-Barral (1999). Debt overhang is, in contrast, a situation where the mix of debt and
equity ex-ante distorts the investment decision. Therefore, the debt restructuring process is principally
aimed at managing the borrowing policy in non-distressed states to avoid such distortions.
Our theoretical results are consistent with the empirical findings that models of distressed debt restruc-
turing such as in Hart and Moore (1998) and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) cannot easily explain.
First, non-distressed debt restructuring is a common occurrence, see Roberts and Sufi (2009) and Nikolaev
(2015). Second, the debt holders often receive equity as payment for debt in workouts, see Franks and
Torous (1994). Moreover, equity as payment for debt is associated with the firm’s growth opportunities,
see James (1995). And, the model predicts that firms restructure the bulk of their old debt only upon
reaching the investment point, followed by new debt issues to fund investment. The pattern of the retire-
ment of old debt followed by sizeable new debt corresponds to the finding of large debt-for-debt exchanges
for fast-growing firms, see Gilson and Warner (1998).
Industry competition, however, matters for our conclusions. In an extension of the model, we address
the problem of renegotiating the debt overhang in firms that operate in a competitive industry. In contrast
to our primary model, the firm optimally writes off its debt overhang immediately. The reason is that the
firm needs to unburden itself from the debt liability as quickly as possible to be able to compete with its
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unlevered peers. Therefore, industry competition matters to the debt-restructuring path.
A paper close to ours is Manso (2008) who studies the problem of risk shifting. The problem in Manso
(2008) is that existing debt distorts the choice of risk in new investments. This choice can be reversed by
default when the debt holder forecloses on the firm’s assets and find it optimal to switch back to less risky
investments. In our debt overhang model, the timing of the firm’s investment is distorted not the level
of risk. When the debt holder takes control of the investment opportunity in default states, it restores
optimal timing. Debt restructuring, however, fixes the problem before the default state. Manso (2008)
does not consider debt restructuring in non-default states. Another related paper is Pawlina (2010). But,
a fundamental difference is that Pawlina (2010) restricts debt restructuring to default states. Mella-Barral
and Perraudin (1997) and Mella-Barral (1999) use a similar modelling technology but do not consider
debt overhang, as is the case for Hart and Moore (1998). Hart and Moore (1998) use different modelling
techniques.
In Section 2, we describe the model. In Section 3, we solve the model for when debt restructuring is
not allowed to happen. Section 4 outlines the optimal solutions for debt restructuring in a non-competitive
industry. In Section 5, we analyse a version of the model set in a competitive industry. Section 6 has a
description of the empirical predictions of the model, and Section 7 is the conclusion.
2 Model
In broad terms, the following describes the model. A firm’s only asset is an investment opportunity. A
potential earnings process yt represents the project’s profitability. The process yt is an observable geometric
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Brownian motion with drift µ and diffusion σ:
dyt = yt (µdt+ σdBt) . (1)
The net cost of the investment opportunity is I. The risk-free rate is r > µ, and a risk-neutral probability
measure governs the Brownian motion Bt. The firm has an exogenous debt liability which it continues to
serve until default. The firm pays a corporate tax at the rate of τ on net earnings. We allow full loss offset
provisions, so the firm always pays the coupon flow net of tax. This assumption is also made in related
models such as Fischer et al. (1989), Goldstein et al. (2001) and Strebulaev (2007). Investors pay zero
investor tax. The shareholders control the investment policy unless the firm defaults and the debt holder
forecloses on the firm’s asset. The key assumptions are as follows.
2.1 Leverage
• The firm owns no other assets except the investment opportunity and has an existing exogenous debt
liability with perpetual coupon flow c.
• The firm services the debt liability by injecting cash, and it has unlimited funds.
• The debt liability remains in place until the firm defaults, or it is renegotiated (along lines described
below).
The debt holder can thus expect to receive the coupon flow up to the point that the firm defaults.
The assumption that the firm continuously injects cash to continue debt service is equivalent to Leland’s
(1994) assumption that the firm continually sells additional equity to fund the coupon flow. Unlike Hart
and Moore (1998), we assume the firm has deep pockets and never becomes cash constrained. The firm
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injects cash, therefore, as long as this is in its interest to do so.
2.2 Default and Debt Recovery
• If the firm defaults on the debt liability at a potential earnings level y, then the full value of the firm is
given by the function X(y).
• If the firm defaults on the debt liability at the realised earnings level y after the investment has been made,
then the full value of the firm is given by the function X¯(y). In line with Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997),
we implement the assumption that X¯(y) is the unlevered value of the firm, that is, X¯(y) = y(1−τ)
r−µ .
• The debt holder recovers in either case 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1 percent of the value of X(y) or X¯(y) which depends
on whether the default happens before or after the investment is made, respectively.
Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) assume X¯(y) is the unlevered value of the firm, whereas Leland
(1994) assumes X¯(y) is unaffected by the capital structure (i.e., the unlevered, untaxed value of the firm).
A realistic value is likely to be somewhere in between these two where leverage is a trade-off between the
tax benefits and the financial distress costs of borrowing. Our choice of X¯(y) underestimates the value of
borrowing in default; but since the recovered value is ξX¯(y) where the constant ξ is arbitrary, it can reflect
the gains from leverage.1
Pawlina (2010) assumes X(y) is zero, but this assumption might be unrealistic because the debt holder
cannot recover any value from an investment opportunity. Tax benefits from leverage and costs linked to
the debt overhang might be embedded in X(y). Moreover, X(y) should also reflect the value of further
debt restructuring (the point in Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) is precisely that debt restructuring
1This argument is not entirely satisfactory. Both recovery values and the derivative of recovery values enter the analysis.
Even if calibrating ξ such that the recovered value of the unlevered firm matches the optimally levered value of the firm, it
does not follow that one matches the derivatives.
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avoids deadweight costs in default). We merely make X(y) and X¯(y), which represent exit points from
the model, exogenous to focus on the debt restructuring that takes place within the context of the model.
2.3 Investment
• The firm has control of the investment process until default.
• New debt issued at the investment stage is always junior to the firm’s existing debt.
• All existing debt at the investment stage remains in place after investment.
• Further changes to the capital structure after the investment point are not permitted.
The model prevents a transfer of the control of the investment process from the firm in any other way
than through default. In practice, debt contracts contain covenants restricting the firm’s choices concerning
its assets (e.g., controlling risk). Since our model is about the investment in an asset that generates positive
cash flow, the debt holder has no interest in reducing the firm’s ability to invest; so in the context of our
model, this assumption is not particularly restrictive. It could be restrictive in cases where the firm could
increase the riskiness of the investment (see Manso (2008)). The firm is allowed to put in place a capital
structure that maximises its wealth at the point of investment, but it cannot make further changes to the
capital structure. We restrict the analysis to the case where the firm’s existing debt is senior to all new
debt, and where no changes to the capital structure happen after investment. A body of literature on debt
overhang with varying degrees of seniority exists (see Sundaresan et al. (2015)) and on the use of secured
debt (see Hennessy and Whited (2005)) exist. This assumption is relaxed, therefore, elsewhere. There
is also a vast literature on dynamic capital structure choices under transaction costs, see, for example,
Fischer et al. (1989), Dangl and Zechner (2004), Titman and Tsyplakov (2007) and Srebulaev (2007). If
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leverage changes are free of cost, then such changes would be continuous, see Leland (1994). Leland (1994),
however, makes the point that increases in borrowing are likely to be resisted by the existing debt holder
because of dilution effects, and reductions in borrowing are never optimal for the firm. These effects mean
that continuous changes to leverage might never happen even if the firm has the option to carry them
out. In our paper, we do not engage with the issue of optimal borrowing after investment and merely
prevent changes from happening. But, this simplification has no bearing on our results beyond a potential
underestimation of the actual value of the firm at the investment point.
2.4 Debt Restructuring and Bargaining Power
• Debt restructuring can take place at zero cost in the earnings window between default and investment,
that is, when the earnings are too large for a default to be optimal and too small for the investment to be
optimal.
• The bargaining power in debt renegotiations is always perfectly and unevenly distributed with either the
firm holding 100% of the bargaining power at all times or the debt holder holding 100% of the bargaining
power at all times.
• The party with bargaining power chooses the timing and form of debt restructuring, which the party
without bargaining power can accept or reject in a take-it-or-leave-it offer.
• The parties cannot use cash payments as part of the debt restructuring process. If the rejection of an offer
takes place the restructuring game stops, and it is not possible to make further debt restructuring offers.
Although the firm always control the investment process, they can not control the debt restructuring
process. Debt restructuring is controlled by the party that holds the bargaining power. The assumptions
8
regarding bargaining power are problematic for several reasons. First, in practice, some sharing of bargain-
ing power should occur. In theory, however, it is convenient to focus on the extreme cases. Since the two
parties disagree in general on the timing of the debt restructuring, the party that prefers delay can reject
the offer and defer agreement. The profitability of suspending agreement is a function of the bargaining
power. With our assumptions, the party without bargaining power can never expect to earn rent in the
bargaining process, now or in the future. Therefore, the value of vetoing an agreement that meets the
reservation level is zero, which simplifies the analysis. We leave out a rigorous study of shared bargaining
power.
The restrictions on cash payments serve to rule out any promise by the firm or the debt holder to
make cash payments to the other party as part of a debt restructuring game. The main issue is to prevent
a debt holder and a firm to make untaxed cash payments to each other in exchange for an increase in
after-tax coupon payments. Since the model assumes taxation only at the corporate level with full offset
provisions, this strategy represents a “money machine” that generates a tax subsidy. The assumption of
stopping at rejection is made to restrict the strategy options for the players. In continuous time games,
the set of equilibria can be hard to analyse with necessary rigour. For instance, the concept of rejection
and a follow-up offer “in the next instance” require technical modelling assumptions that lie outside our
model. See Rosu (2006) for a discussion of continuous time games.
Existing debt restructuring games include the continuous auction model used in Mella-Barral and
Perraudin (1997) and Mella-Barral (1999), and the continuous bargaining model used in Pawlina (2010).
These models assume debt forgiveness or payment holidays where temporary changes to the payment
schedule are made to avoid the deadweight costs of default, but ultimately the original contractual payment
schedule resumes. Avoiding the deadweight cost of default generates a bargaining surplus for both parties.
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Our model rules out such renegotiations and focuses instead on the debt restructuring that happens in
the window between default and investment. Within this window, the existing contract is by definition
acceptable for both parties, but it might not be the optimal contract because it distorts the timing of the
investment decision. Therefore, we need to consider permanent changes to the contractual arrangements
in the form of debt-for-equity or equity-for-debt exchanges as a means of debt restructuring. An agreement
for a party to pay more (or less) in current states must be matched by a promise to pay less (or more) in
future states. Payment holidays of the type mentioned above cannot achieve this. An example of a game
using exchange offers is Christensen et al. (2014) in the context of adjustments to capital structures with
callable debt.
3 Unrestructured Debt
In this section, we solve the model by using all the modelling assumptions presented in Section 2 except
those outlined in subsection 2.4 which allow take-it-or-leave-it offers. Therefore, paragraphs 2.1-3 fully
describe the model. The firm observes the potential earnings flow yt and makes one of three decisions. First,
they do nothing and continue paying the coupon flow c according to the original contractual arrangements.
Second, they default on the coupon flow c which leads to the debt holder foreclosing on the firm’s assets.
Third, they invest at cost I which yields the (now realised) earnings flow yt. The model continues as long
as the firm chooses the first option. The model stops at the second option when the debt holder forecloses
on the investment opportunity. The model also ends at the investment point, which creates a levered firm
with a risky earnings flow (as in Leland (1994)).
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3.1 Trigger Strategies
We study the use of trigger strategies to stop the model. Let y∗ denote the default trigger and yI the
investment trigger, such that for y∗ < yt < yI the firm continues paying the coupon flow. The first time
yt equals y∗ or yI , represented by the stopping time T , the firm respectively defaults or invests. We use
V (with no bar) to denote the value of the firm and VB to denote the value of the firm’s debt for t < T .
We also use V¯ (with bar) to denote the value of the firm and V¯B to denote the value of the firm’s debt
for t = T . Since the debt is never restructured, the debt holder recovers ξX(y) from a default before the
investment is made and ξX¯(y∗) after. At investment, the firm’s value is V¯ (yI , c), which is shared between
the (old) debt, V¯B(yI , c), and the equity, V¯ (yI , c)− V¯B(yI , c). The firm has the option to borrow new debt
at the point of investment and incur a new coupon liability of δ ≥ 0. The value of the new debt is V¯B(yI , δ).
The firm funds the investment net of selling new debt. So, correcting for the contribution of the new debt,
the net equity value is V¯ (yI , c) − V¯B(yI , c) − I. Building on the boundary conditions outlined above, we
can express the debt values in terms of expected cash flows:
VB(yt, c) = E
(∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)cds+ e−r(T−t)
(
IξX(y∗) + (1− I)V¯B(yI , c))
))
, (2)
where I is an indicator function which takes the value one for yT = y∗ and zero for yT = yI . Similarly, the
value of the equity is the residual value until default or investment happens:
V (yt, c)− VB(yt, c) = E
(
−
∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)c(1− τ)ds+ e−r(T−t)(1− I)(V¯ (yI , c)− V¯B(yI , c)− I)
)
. (3)
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Combining (2) and (3), we find the value of the firm for t < T :
V (yt, c) = E
(∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)cτds+ e−r(T−t)
(
IξX(y∗) + (1− I)(V¯ (yI , c)− I)
))
, (4)
where we recognise that the firm benefits from the tax shield of borrowing until the stopping time T at
the cost of deadweight losses in the event that yT = y∗.
The essential problem in this section is to choose the optimal stopping time T . Consider first yT = yI .
At investment, the firm can incur new junior debt, and a new default trigger is formed which depends on
the total coupon flow c+ δ, which is denoted y¯∗ (we impose the same notational convention outlined above
and use a single bar to indicate that the trigger applies to the period after the investment is made). We can
use Leland’s (1994) formula for default directly which yields the default trigger y¯∗ = c+δ
r
(r−µ) λ1
λ1−1 , where
λ1 is given by
(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)− ((1
2
− µ
σ2
)2
+ 2r
σ2
)1/2
. The restructured value of the firm at the default trigger is
X¯(y∗) from which the debt holder can recover a fraction ξ. The value of the firm after investment, V¯ (yt, c),
can therefore be written in the following way:
V¯ (yt, c) =
yt(1− τ)
r − µ +
(c+ δ)τ
r
(
1−
(
yt
y¯∗
)λ1)
− (1− ξ)X¯(y∗)
(
yt
y¯∗
)λ1
, (5)
In equation (5) the firm’s value is decomposed into three terms on the right-hand side. The first term is
the discounted value of the unlevered earnings flow after tax. The second term is the value of the debt tax
shield in non-default states. The probability 1−
(
y
y¯∗
)λ1
can be interpreted as the risk neutral probability of
no default. Finally, the third term is the expected value of the deadweight costs of default, which happens
with risk neutral probability
(
y
y¯∗
)λ1
.
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Using (5), we obtain expressions for the optimal level of new debt δ at yT = yI provided we have an
expression for X¯(y). Next, assume first that c = 0 so that all debt is issued at the point of investment. By
differentiating V¯ (yI , 0) with respect to δ, we find the optimal debt δˆ which is the first best level of debt,
δˆ =
(
r
r − µ
λ1 − 1
λ1
)(
τ
τ − λ1(1− ξ(1− τ))
)− 1
λ1
yI =
(
r
r − µ
λ1 − 1
λ1
)
pi
− 1
λ1 yI , (6)
where we have defined pi = τ
τ−λ1(1−ξ(1−τ)) . The expression in (6) is linear in yI which means that the risk
neutral probability of default,
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1
, is independent of y and given by
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1
= pi at the investment
trigger yI . Therefore, the optimal investment trigger yI can therefore be identified by standard smooth
pasting techniques (shown for instance in Dixit (1993)):
yI =
[
1− τ
r − µ +
τ
r − µ
λ1 − 1
λ1
(
yI
y¯∗
)−1(
1−
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1)
− (1− ξ)
(
yI
y¯∗
)−1(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1]−1
I
λ2
λ2 − 1
=
[
1− τ
r − µ +
τ
r − µ
λ1 − 1
λ1
pi
− 1
λ1 (1− pi)− (1− ξ)pi1− 1λ1
]−1
I
λ2
λ2 − 1 , (7)
where λ2 =
(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)
+
((
1
2
− µ
σ2
)2
+ 2r
σ2
)1/2
. Further, in this expression, yI can be identified exactly since
the ratio yI
y¯∗ is constant. If the tax rate is zero so that debt had no value, then the investment trigger is
that of an unlevered firm, δˆ = 0 and yI = I(r−µ) λ2λ2−1 , which is identical to the investment trigger derived
in Dixit (1993). Therefore, the expressions inside the large bracket are associated with the optimal debt
tax shield and the cost of default.
Now consider that c > 0. In this case we cannot easily pin down the investment trigger point, and
moreover the risk neutral probability of default is not necessarily independent of y or c at the investment
trigger. The recovered assets in default at the default trigger y¯∗ between the old debt holder (entitled
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to the coupon flow c) and the new one (entitled to the coupon flow δ) depends on seniority. Using the
assumptions about seniority and debt recovery the value of the old debt after the investment is made is
given by:
V¯B(yt, c) =
c
r
(
1−
(
yt
y¯∗
)λ1)
+ min
(
ξ
y¯∗(1− τ)
r − µ ,
c
r
)(
yt
y¯∗
)λ1
, (8)
and the value of the new debt is given by:
V¯B(yt, δ) =
δ
r
(
1−
(
yt
y¯∗
)λ1)
+
(
ξ
y¯∗(1− τ)
r − µ −min
(
ξ
y¯∗(1− τ)
r − µ ,
c
r
))(
yt
y¯∗
)λ1
. (9)
Both (8) and (9) have the same general structure. The first term is the contribution to the debt value
from the coupon payments that are received in no-default states. This contribution is multiplied by the
risk neutral probability of no default. The second term is the contribution to the debt value from the debt
recovery that takes place in default states that is multiplied by the risk neutral probability of default. The
firm can default in states where the recovered value of the firm exceeds the nominal claim of the old debt
holder, which explains the use of the minimum operators in the second terms of (8) and (9). Equations
(5), (8) and (9) provide the values of the firm and the debt after the investment is made, which can be
used to work out the optimal timing of investment and default triggers prior to the investment decision.
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3.2 Optimal Investment and Default
Before we proceed with the analysis, we define the following matrix which we use for the results that follow.
The matrix provides the solution to smooth pasting problems in a compact way.
M(y) :=
 yλ1 yλ2
λ1y
λ1−1 λ2yλ2−1
 . (10)
Appendix A explains the parameters λ1 =
(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)−√(1
2
− µ
σ2
)2
+ 2r
σ2
and λ2 =
(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)
+
√(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)2
+ 2r
σ2
.
Also define Γ(yI , c, δ) = V¯ (yI , c)− V¯B(yI , c)− I, which is a measure of the equity value at the investment
trigger point yI . Γ depends on the old debt c but also on the new debt δ because the firm can borrow fresh
debt as part of funding the investment cost. The objective is to derive the stopping times for the default
and investment associated with a debt overhang c. The following result helps set out the conditions for
optimal new debt at the investment point.
Lemma 1: Assume ξX¯(y¯∗) < c
r
. The first order condition to the problem maxδ Γ(yI , c, δ) is δ¯ which is
implicitly given by the following equation:
ln yI = ln
(
r − µ
r
λ1
λ1 − 1c
)
+
1
λ1
ln
(
τ
τ − 2λ1
)
+
λ1 + 1
λ1
ln
(
1 +
δ¯
c
)
+ ln
(
1 +
τ − λ1
τ − 2λ1
δ¯
c
)
. (11)
The solution δ¯ can be positive or negative depending on c.
The condition ξX¯(y¯∗) < c
r
states that the recovered restructured value in default, the left-hand side,
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is less than the risk-free value of the senior debt holders, the right-hand side. Therefore, this restriction
ensures that the old debt is risky post-investment. If the old debt becomes risk-free post-investment, the
new debt depends directly on the unlevered solution given in (6). From Lemma 1, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 (Optimal New Junior Debt and Investment/Default Triggers): There are three
cases, listed in the following table:
Case Condition Optimal δ P(Default) =
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1
1 δ¯ < 0 0
(
r
r−µ
λ1−1
λ1
)λ1 (
yI
c
)λ1
2 δ¯ ≥ 0, ξX¯(y¯∗) < c
r
δ¯ τ−λ1(1−ξ(1−τ))
τ−λ1(2c+δ)/(c+δ)pi
3 δ¯ ≥ 0, ξX¯(y¯∗) ≥ c
r
δˆ − c pi
In all cases, the optimal default trigger y∗ and the investment trigger yI are determined by the following
system:
M−1(y∗)
 cr (1− τ)
0
 = M−1(yI)
 Γ(yI , c, δ) + cr (1− τ)
Γ′(yI , c, δ)
 (12)
The three cases differ mainly in the firm’s ability to make use of new junior debt. In Case 1 the firm
has already exceeded the optimal threshold of debt through its debt overhang, so no new debt is issued.
In Case 3 the debt overhang is so small that the amount of new debt is merely the difference between the
desired level of borrowing for an unlevered firm, that is, δˆ, and the old debt, c. Case 2 is somewhere in
between. The firm borrows new debt, but the debt overhang distorts the total debt burden.
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We identify three sources of inefficiency. First, the fact that the firm can choose default before invest-
ment means a loss due to restructuring in default. Second, the debt overhang distorts the timing of the
investment decision. Third, the debt overhang prevents the firm from obtaining optimal leverage at the
investment trigger. These three sources of inefficiency generate incentives for the firm to restructure its
debt overhang.
4 Debt Restructuring
In this section, we analyse the full model.2 The procedure consists of two steps. First, we give the parties
the option to renegotiate the debt away in one lump sum and investigate the optimal timing of conversion
to unlevered status. Second, we allow smaller debt-for-equity or equity-for-debt exchanges before the firm
carries out a full conversion to unlevered status.
4.1 Optimal Timing of Conversion to Unlevered Status
In this subsection, we restrict the set of actions to debt-for-equity exchange offers where equity replaces all
existing debt. Therefore, the outcome is a conversion to unlevered status. As in Section 3, we use trigger
strategies to investigate this issue. We define a stopping time T where the firm makes a debt-for-equity
offer to remove the entire debt burden. There may be multiple triggers for such offers. Stopping time T is
the first opportunity to one of these trigger values. Let yT = yˆ. If yˆ < y∗ and the firm holds the bargaining
power, then the debt holder needs to receive at least ξX(yˆ) worth of equity and the firm retains the residual
equity (1− ξ)X(yˆ). If the debt holder holds the bargaining power, then the firm needs to receive at least
2In a previous draft, we included the possibility of distressed debt restructuring, but that approach was not fruitful. Since
the firm never invests in default states, debt forgiveness does not improve investment efficiency.
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zero with the debt holder retaining all equity X(yˆ). Similarly if yˆ ≥ y∗ and the firm holds the bargaining
power, then the debt holder needs to receive at least VB(yˆ, c) worth of equity with the firm retaining the
residual equity V (yˆ, 0)− VB(yˆ, c). If the debt holder holds the bargaining power, the firm needs to receive
at least V (yˆ, c) − VB(yˆ, c) with the debt holder retaining the residual equity VB(yˆ, c) + V (yˆ, 0) − V (yˆ, c).
These constraints form the following result:
Proposition 2 (Optimal Conversion to Unlevered Status): Consider a debt overhang c and asso-
ciated unrestructured default and investment trigger y∗ and yI respectively, that satisfy (12). There are
two restructuring point yˆL ≤ yˆH . The lower trigger point yˆL = y∗ and the upper trigger point yˆH solve the
following system: (
yˆλ1L yˆ
λ2
L
)
M−1(yˆH)
 Γ(yˆH , 0, δˆ)− cτr
Γ′(yˆH , 0, δˆ)
 = V (yˆL, 0)− cτr , (13)
where Γ(yˆ, 0, δˆ) = V¯ (yˆ, 0)− I, and the new debt δˆ is determined by (6). For yt ∈ (yˆL, yˆH), the debt holder
or the firm, no matter which one holds the bargaining power, holds out for a restructuring until yt = yˆL or
yt = yˆH , whichever happens first, where a conversion to unlevered status occurs. For yt /∈ (yˆL, yˆH) there is
immediate restructuring. If the debt holder holds the bargaining power, then it offers the firm new equity
worth V (yˆ, c) − VB(yˆ, c) at the restructuring point yˆ, and if the firm holds the bargaining power, then it
offers the debt holder new equity worth VB(yˆ, c).
For the debt holder, the problem is to find the optimal time to switch a coupon flow c for a share in
the potential earnings flow yt. Any restructuring in the region below y∗ cannot happen because the debt
holder cannot make cash payments to the firm, so the firm instead exercises its right to default on the
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Debt level c
Trigger values
y∗, yˆL
yI
yˆH
Figure 1: The figure shows the unrestructured default and investment triggers (y∗ and yI , resp.) and the
lower and upper restructuring triggers (yˆL and yˆH , resp.).
coupon flow. Moreover, any promise of an increased equity stake in the firm to continue debt service for
yt < y
∗ is not credible. Therefore, the lower restructuring point is given by yˆL = y∗. When the firm holds
the bargaining power, restructuring the debt is always optimal is always optimal at the default trigger y∗
rather than below because any buyout of debt below the default trigger must compensate the debt holder
for ξ percent of the restructured value of the firm. Therefore, any restructuring below y∗ yields the same
sharing of equity between the debt holder and the firm but costs the firm additional coupon payments.
Therefore, the firm also prefers that the lower restructuring trigger is at y∗. What may seem surprising
is that the optimisation problem that determines the upper restructuring point is identical for the two
parties. This is so because the efficiency gain is captured entirely by the party holding the bargaining
power. So, the optimal timing of the conversion to equity, which leads to investment, is the same for either
party.
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In Figure 1, we show the numerical values for the default trigger and the lower restructuring point
(y∗ and yˆL) as well as the investment trigger with unrestructured debt (yI) and the upper restructuring
point (yˆH). We note that the investment trigger curve shows erratic behaviour near the left-hand starting
point. The irregularity is because, with unrestructured debt, the ability to issue new debt at investment
(δ) depends on the current debt levels. The transition from Case 1 to Case 2 in Proposition 1 leads to a
benefit for the firm as it can now issue new debt at the investment point. The transition from Case 2 to
Case 3 leads to a disadvantage for the firm as the old debt now becomes risk-free. There is no noticeable
irregularity in the default trigger curve nor the upper restructuring point curve. Near default, the amount
of new debt issued at the investment trigger has a negligible impact; for the upper restructuring point, δ
does not affect the investment decision. We also note that while the lower restructuring trigger (identical
to the unrestructured default trigger) increases monotonically with the debt liability, the upper restruc-
turing point, yˆH , is non-monotonic. As c → 0 the default trigger goes to zero and the investment trigger
goes to the unlevered investment trigger. At the limiting point, there is no debt liability to restructure,
but the limiting values of the upper restructuring point do go towards the unlevered investment trigger
as the existing debt liability becomes small. At first, the upper restructuring trigger increases with the
debt liability, but beyond a certain threshold, it starts to decrease. We use this feature to generate a
full restructuring equilibrium in the next subsection. Before that, we address the question of whether
the restructuring policy maximises the firm’s value as well as the value to the individual party with the
bargaining power. The fact that the firm and the debt holder agree on the restructuring policy suggests it
is, and we confirm this with the following result:
Proposition 3 (Restructuring Efficiency): The restructuring policy described in Proposition 3 max-
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imises the value of the restructured firm.
Why is the investment trigger with the restructuring policy in Proposition 2 not the same as the
investment trigger for the unlevered firm? The answer lies in the treatment of taxes. With full offset
provisions the firm pays only the after-tax coupon (1−τ)c whereas the debt holder receives the full coupon
flow c. Therefore, the levered firm earns a tax credit flow c− (1− τ)c = τc between the default trigger and
the investment trigger. The tax credit increases the value of the levered firm relative to the unlevered firm.
In practice, firms in the US can to some extent carry a loss to a period where they make offsets. Therefore,
our model overstates the tax benefit from borrowing during a period where the firm does not earn income.
An alternative tractable modelling specification is that corporate taxes are paid only when the firm has
positive earnings (Titman and Tsyplakov (2007) and Pawlina (2010)). However, this modelling specification
understates the tax effects. Most tax systems allow losses to be carried forward for some time. The reality
lies somewhere in between these two modelling extremes. Therefore, the efficiency improvements arise in
the context of allowing the levered firm to obtain some tax credits in the period before restructuring the
debt. A debt overhang can, therefore, be valuable. A full debt restructuring avoids the distortions to the
investment trigger just before investment.
In this subsection, we have assumed repurchases of debt with equity in a single transaction. In Mao
and Tserlukevich (2015), firms use cash to repurchase debt. US firms that operate under Chapter 11 can
accumulate cash reserves, which makes this a plausible proposition. Our model does not allow for Chapter
11 creditor protection; and Franks and Torous (1994) show that the use of equity, preferred stock or new
debt is more common for debt restructuring by firms that operate outside Chapter 11. The management of
debt in between the two restructuring points motivates the search for an overall restructuring equilibrium
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which we carry out next.
4.2 Full Restructuring Equilibrium
In this section, we characterise the full restructuring equilibrium. Before we state the problem, we define
the following expressions:
 K1
K2
 = M−1(yˆL)
 cr (1− τ)
0
−M−1(yI)
 Γ(yI , c, δ) + cr (1− τ)
Γ′(yI , c, δ)
 , (14)
which is the condition described in Proposition 1, and
K3 =
(
yˆλ1L yˆ
λ2
L
)
M−1(yˆH)
 Γ(yˆH , 0, δˆ)− cτr
Γ′(yˆH , 0, δˆ)
− (V (yˆL, 0)− cτr ) , (15)
which is the condition described in Proposition 3. The expression in (14) determines the unrestructured
default trigger yˆL and the unrestructured investment trigger yI when K1 and K2 are equal to zero and the
expression in (15) determines the upper restructuring trigger yˆH when K3 is equal to zero. Consider the
following Lagrange program:
max
c,yˆL,yˆH
L(c, yˆL, yˆH |y) =
(
yλ1 yλ2
)
M−1(yˆH)
 Γ(yˆH , 0, δˆ)− cτr
Γ′(yˆH , 0, δˆ)
+ cτr (16.a)
subject to Ki = 0, i = 1, 2, 3 (16.b)
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The program in (16.a-b) maximises the value of the firm that is constrained by its default and investment
policy if no restructuring takes place (constraints K1 and K2) and a complete of all debt in debt-for-equity
exchanges at the optimal times (constraint K3). We demonstrate that the solution for this program, which
essentially creates a map between the current state y and the value maximising debt burden c, also defines
the optimal debt restructuring solutions for the firm because if the firm does not choose the optimal
borrowing level for the current state both parties are made better off by choosing a different borrowing
policy. The Lagrangian is (using Lagrange multipliers ϕi, i = 1, 2, 3):
max
c,yˆL,yˆH ,ϕi,i=1,2,3
L(c, yˆL, yˆH , ϕi, i = 1, 2, 3|y) = L(c, yˆL, yˆH |y)−
3∑
i=1
ϕiKi (17)
The following result outlines the solution to this program.
Lemma 2 The solution to (17) is given by the following condition:
∂L/∂c =
(
∂K1/∂c ∂K2/∂c
) ∂K1/∂c ∂K2/∂c
∂K1/∂yˆL ∂K2/∂yˆL

−1 ∂L/∂c− ∂L/∂yˆH ∂K3/∂c∂K3/∂yˆH
∂L/∂yˆL − ∂L/∂yˆH ∂K3/∂yˆL∂K3/∂yˆH

+ ∂L/∂yˆH
∂K3/∂yˆL
∂K3/∂yˆH
(18)
This problem has a unique solution c∗(yt) for all 0 < yt ≤ y¯, with y¯ the maximal value for yˆH satisfying (13).
The point y¯ marks the ultimate conversion point where the firm eventually retires all debt and issues
new debt to invest. Before reaching this investment point, the optimisation program chooses the lower
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and upper restructuring points to maximise the value of the firm given the current state y. When y gets
sufficiently close to the lower restructuring point, it is optimal to lower the debt burden to push the lower
restructuring point even further down. When y gets sufficiently close to the upper restructuring point,
it is optimal to increase the debt burden to push the upper restructuring point even higher up. This
process ultimately stops when y goes to zero where existing debt also goes to zero, and when y gets close
to y¯, where the investment takes place. A continuous sequence of small debt-for-equity or equity-for-debt
exchanges achieves the implementation of the borrowing policy in Lemma 2. We now address the issue of
whether this sequence represents an equilibrium:
Proposition 4: If at time 0 the state variable is y0 ≤ y¯ and the firm carries a debt burden c∗(y0), then
the continuous sequence of debt-for-equity and equity-for-debt exchanges that implement the optimal debt
burden c∗(yt), t ≥ 0 are each a solution to Lemma 3. Thus, for yt < y¯, the maintenance of the debt burden
c∗(yt) and the full retirement of all debt in a debt-for-equity exchange at yt = y¯ represent an equilibrium.
If the firm carries a debt burden c 6= c∗(y0), then in this case the firm carries out a large debt-for-equity or
equity-for-debt exchange such that the debt burden is equal to c∗(y0). There is no other equilibrium.
Proposition 4 sets out the optimal path of borrowing up to the point where the investment takes place.
The policy maximises the value of the firm by picking the appropriate lower and upper restructuring points
at all times. The continuous sequence of debt-for-equity and equity-for-debt exchanges implements the
equilibrium. Equilibrium arises by exploring whether alternative paths generate profits for the parties.
However, any restructuring path must be tied down to a full retirement of all debt at the investment point.
Thus, a search for deviations before reaching the investment trigger point y¯ suffices. A deviation is not
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possible unless the parties can make cash payments directly to each other; so the assumption preventing
such payments is crucial to obtaining a unique equilibrium. If the firm makes a one-dollar coupon payment
to the debt holders, then the cost to the firm is net of tax (this is a direct consequence of the assumption of
full offset provisions), and the debt holder benefits in full. Therefore, if the debt holder pays cash payments
to the firm as compensation, both parties are always better off. Therefore, the identifation of the optimal
restructuring path relies on the restriction of the use of cash payments. The only way the firm has an
incentive to pay an extra one-dollar coupon payment in some state of nature is either if it increases the
value of the firm or if the firm could pay less to the debt holders in other states. The first is not feasible
along the optimal path. The second is never incentive compatible for the debt holder. Therefore, the only
restructuring equilibrium follows precisely the path laid out by Lemma 2.
4.3 Links to Existing Dynamic Capital Structure Theory
Our model outlines a debt restructuring equilibrium with actively managed debt in all non-distressed
states before investing. The existing theory on a dynamic capital structure also studies similar optimal
borrowing problems. There is a relatively clear divide between capital structure theory which deals with
the management of the debt burden in non-distressed states and the debt restructuring theory which
typically describes the renegotiation between the firm and the debt holder in a distressed state. In our
debt overhang model, this distinction breaks down. Therefore, we discuss the similarities and differences
between the theory on dynamic capital structure and the restructuring of the debt overhang.
At a superficial level, the research often specifies the terms of redemption of old debt differently from
the debt restructuring games we play in our model: for instance, redemption at par values (Dangl and
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Zechner (2004)) with call provisions (Christensen et al. (2002)), or at market prices (Leland (1994)).
Prepayment covenants where repurchases are at prices above market values typically prevent leverage
reductions. Therefore, debt becomes expensive to retire near distress states. The policies for optimal
dynamic borrowing can involve a stepwise increasing debt burden up to the point where the firm eventually
defaults (Dangl and Zechner (2004)). In debt restructuring models, either the debt is restructured in default
(Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997)) or to avoid default such as in our model. There is a softening of the
debt burden near default states in our model which does not occur in optimal capital structure models.
Therefore, the relaxation of the prepayment covenants of debt partially explains the different prediction
in debt management.
However, there are more profound differences. Dynamic capital structure models are essentially trade-off
models where borrowing aims to protect the firm from losses due to taxes and bankruptcy costs (Fischer
et al. (1989), Dangl and Zechner (2004), Strebulaev (2007)). Leland (1994) considers small changes to
leverage that are carried out at market prices. Such changes create a dilution effect for the debt holder
with increases in borrowing and losses for the firm with reductions in borrowing. In Leland’s (1994) model,
changes in leverage have no real effects other than changing the timing of default. In contrast, in our model
leverage has a real direct impact since it influences the timing of the investment. The essential problem in
a debt restructuring model with debt overhang is to induce the correct investment incentives for the firm.
But this is of similar concern for the debt holder because it also stand to gain from investment efficiency.
Therefore, we are more likely to see that the debt holder and the firm agree on the management of debt,
as predicted by our model.
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5 An Extension of the Model to a Competitive Industry
As an extension, we consider a firm with an existing debt overhang which seeks entry into a competitive
industry. There are several existing industry equilibrium models that show financing in continuous time,
and our extension builds on the model by Leahy (1993), and its extensions by Fries et al. (1997) and
Zhdanov (2007). An alternative model is Miao (2005); but in contrast to the previous models cited,
Miao’s (2005) model does not accommodate the uncertainty on the product’s price in equilibrium which
makes it inconsistent with our primary model. We build mainly on Fries et al. (1997), where firms
make investments and enter an industry when product prices are high, and exit when they are low. The
endogenous entry decisions create downward pressure on product prices, and the endogenous exit decisions
create a corresponding upward pressure; so, the competitive forces in the industry affect the product’s
price process. In between the entry and exit points, however, the price uncertainty is driven by the same
exogenous consumption shocks that drive equation (1), which makes this model a suitable extension of the
primary model outlined in the previous sections.
We briefly outline the Fries et al. (1997) setup. The aggregate earnings flow in the industry is written
as yt = xtD(qt) where xt represents consumption shocks modelled as a geometric Brownian motion with
drift µ and diffusion σ, and D(qt) is an inverse demand function (product price) of the aggregate capacity
qt in the industry. Thus, applying Ito’s Lemma, we find:
dyt = D(qt)dxt + xtD
′(qt)dqt = xtD(qt)
(
µdt+ σdBt +
D′(qt)
D(qt)
dqt
)
= yt
(
µdt+ σdBt +
D′(qt)
D(qt)
dqt
)
(20)
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This expression is identical to (1) except for the third term which responds to capacity changes in the
industry. This term becomes non-zero only at the entry and exit triggers. As long as the capacity qt is
constant the third term is zero and the earnings flow is described by (1) as in the non-competitive case.
If entry into the industry takes place and the term dqt > 0 and product prices fall, then the influx of new
firms negatively influences the earnings flow yt. Further, if exit takes place and the term dqt < 0 and
product prices increase, then the earnings flow is affected but in the opposite direction. The Fries et al.
(1997) model assumes instantaneous entry and exit so that there is a cap on total earnings yE where the
entry takes place (and on the boundary dyt = 0), and a floor on total earnings yB where the exit takes
place (and on this boundary dyt = 0 also), and an inverse demand function which is iso-elastic D(qt) = q
− 1
κ
t
where κ > 0 is constant. Therefore, D′(qt) = − 1qtκD(qt). At the exit point, the probability of exit of any
arbitrary firm is approximated by dqt
qt
, such that dqt
qt
= −κD′(qt)
D(qt)
dqt. Therefore, the inverse demand function
for the industry has a direct impact on the likelihood of default. This is the essential point made in Fries
et al. (1997). The model itself is a version of a stochastic flow model as outlined in Harrison (1985).
Consider an unlevered firm. Perfect competition leads to entry at the entry trigger yE such that the
firm makes zero profits, which means its value minus the investment cost is exactly zero. The firm can
issue debt to partially finance the investment cost as the debt leads to tax advantages. As demonstrated in
Fries et al. (1997) this type of financing means that a competitive firm has value equal to the investment
cost at the entry point. The valuation of the debt issued at the point of investment, which has a coupon
flow δ if we adopt the notation used in the previous sections, is as follows: The debt value is constant
at the entry trigger yE but its behaviour is a bit more complicated at the exit trigger yB. The relative
exit of capacity at this trigger is dqt
qt
, and assuming the firm is as likely to default as any other firm, the
probability of default is also dqt
qt
. The value of the firm’s assets is at this stage zero, so the expected loss
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to the debt holder is dqt
qt
V¯B(yB). Therefore, the drift in the debt value V¯B(yB) if the firm does not default
must be exactly equal to the expected loss dqt
qt
V¯B(yB). The two boundary conditions describe the valuation
formula for debt (as demonstrated in Fries et al. (1997)):
V¯B(y, δ) =
c
r
+
(
yλ1 yλ2
) λ1yλ1E λ2yλ2E
(λ1 − κ)yλ1B (λ2 − κ)yλ2B

−1 0
κc
r
 (21)
The valuation of equity accounts for the debt tax shield.
We extend this model into a model of debt overhang by assuming the firm carries a debt liability before
entering the industry. The entry point marks an investment decision which can become distorted by such
debt overhang, and therefore creates incentives for debt restructuring. Consider a competitive firm that
is planning to enter the industry at the entry trigger point yE. The value of that firm just after entry is
exactly equal to the investment cost I (this is true even if the firm issues debt as a partial funding of the
investment cost), and since the industry is competitive the value of the investment opportunity must be
constant at this point. Therefore, we can solve for the unknown parameters A and B in the general form
of the value of the investment opportunity Ayλ1 +Byλ2 by evaluating these coefficients at the entry trigger
yE, where both the value of the investment opportunity and its derivative are zero:
M(yE)
 A
B
 =
 0
0

which means A = B = 0 since the matrix M is non-singular. The value of a competitive firm with an
identical investment plan but which carries a debt overhang with a coupon flow of c is, therefore, negative.
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Hence, in the absence of debt restructuring the firm defaults immediately.
Hence some debt restructuring is necessary to allow a competitive firm with debt overhang to enter
the industry. The only possible equilibrium is one in which there is a complete debt write-off (a debt-for-
nothing exchange) which takes place the moment the debt overhang arises. Therefore, industry competition
makes the debt restructuring process a lot simpler than what is the case in the primary model. The firm
cannot expect to make any tax-related gains from debt in the period before entry into the industry, so the
debt tax shield falls to the debt issued after entry. In our primary model, the firm can earn a debt tax
shield before the investment point because its investment trigger can change to accommodate various debt
levels. In non-competitive industries, the investment point is the optimal time to redeem old debt, whereas
in competitive industries the optimal time is when the debt overhang arises. In an oligopoly model, we
conjecture that the retirement of debt overhang happens at some intermediate stage, because an optimal
trade-off should exist between keeping the tax benefits of debt alive at the same time as not giving up too
much on the firm’s competitive advantage. We leave a rigorous study of this point to future work.
6 Conclusions
We study the restructuring process of a pure debt overhang and find that the firm actively manages its
borrowing by a sequence of continuous debt-for-equity or equity-for-debt exchanges to maintain positive
leverage before reaching the investment trigger point. At the investment trigger, the firm retires all old
debt and borrows new fresh debt to partially finance the investment cost, which is consistent with the
existing empirical evidence. The existing debt restructuring models do not predict these findings.
Industry competition matters to our conclusions. Whereas in non-competitive industries the firm main-
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tains an optimal positive debt overhang and retires all existing debt only when it reaches the investment
trigger point, in competitive industries the optimal debt overhang is always zero. There is a tension be-
tween keeping a debt overhang alive to capture the tax benefits of debt and eliminating the debt overhang
to strengthen the firm’s competitive position. In a non-competitive industry, the first effect dominates
whereas in a perfectly competitive industry the second does.
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Appendix A: Valuation
Dixit (1993) describes the valuation framework. The value of a claim F on an earnings flow yt which
generates a cash flow f(yt) satisfies the ODE L(F (yt)) + f(yt) = 0 where the infinitesimal operator is:
L =
σ2
2
y2t
d2
dy2
+ µyt
d
dy
− r. (A.1)
The homogeneous part of this ODE has the general solution Ayλ1t + By
λ2
t for arbitrary constants A and
B which span the entire solution set. The non-homogeneous term determines the particular solution.
For instance, if f(yt) = c, then the particular solution is cr since L
(
c
r
)
= −c; and if f(yt) = yt, then
the particular solution is yt
r−µ since L
(
yt
r−µ
)
= −yt. The coefficients λ1 and λ2 are the negative and
positive roots, respectively, of the characteristic equation 1
2
σ2λ(λ − 1) + µλ − r = 0, and are given by
λ1 =
(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)−√(1
2
− µ
σ2
)2
+ 2r
σ2
, and λ2 =
(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)
+
√(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)2
+ 2r
σ2
.
Appendix B: Proofs
Derivation of Equation (6): The first order condition obtained by differentiating V¯ (yI , 0) with respect
to δ and set equal to zero is:
dV¯ (yI , 0)
dδ
=
τ
r
(
1−
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1)
− δτ
r
d
dδ
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1
− (1− ξ)1− τ
r − µ
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1 dy¯∗
dδ
− (1− ξ) y¯
∗(1− τ)
r − µ
d
dδ
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1
(B.1)
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We use the definition of y¯∗ = δ
r
(r − µ) λ1
λ1−1 to obtain
dy¯∗
dδ
=
r − µ
r
λ1
λ1 − 1 (B.2.a)
d
dδ
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1
= λ1
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1−1(
− yI
y¯∗2
)
dy¯∗
dδ
=
λ1
y¯∗
r − µ
r
λ1
λ1 − 1
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1
(B.2.b)
Incorporating these expression into the first order condition above we find
0 =
τ
r
(
1−
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1)
+
δτ
r
λ1
y¯∗
r − µ
r
λ1
λ1 − 1
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1
− (1− ξ)1− τ
r − µ
r − µ
r
λ1
λ1 − 1
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1
+ (1− ξ) y¯
∗(1− τ)
r − µ
λ1
y¯∗
r − µ
r
λ1
λ1 − 1
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1
(B.3)
Rearranging and eliminating terms we eliminate all terms containing δ except where δ appears as part of
the risk neutral probability of default:
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1
=
τ
−(λ1 − 1)τ − λ1(1− τ)(1− ξ) . (B.4)
Taking both sides to the power of 1
λ1
, rearranging and using the definition of y¯∗, Equation (6) follows. 
Proof of Lemma 1: At the investment trigger point yI the firm makes the investment and retain its
value, V¯ (yI , c), receives the proceeds from new borrowing V¯B(yI , δ), but must pay the investment cost I
and retain the total debt liability V¯B(yI , c) + V¯B(yI , δ). Then, the firm sets δ such as to maximise the net
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value, V¯ (yI , c)− I − V¯B(yI , c). This program can be expressed as:
max
δ≥0
(
1− τ
r − µyI +
c+ δ
r
τ
(
1−
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1)
− (1− ξ)1− τ
r − µy¯
∗
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1
−I − c
r
(
1−
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1)
−min
(
ξ
1− τ
r − µy¯
∗,
c
r
)(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1)
, (B.5)
where y¯∗ = r−µ
r
λ1
λ1−1(c + δ). The assumption made in the result implies that min
(
ξ 1−τ
r−µ y¯
∗, c
r
)
= ξ 1−τ
r−µ y¯
∗.
The first order condition for the program above then becomes
0 =
τ
r
(
1−
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1)
− c+ δ
r
τλ1
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1−1(
− yI
y¯∗2
)
r − µ
r
λ1
λ1 − 1 −
1− τ
r − µ
r
r − µ
λ1
λ1 − 1
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1
− 1− τ
r − µy¯
∗λ1
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1−1(
− yI
y¯∗2
)
r − µ
r
λ1
λ1 − 1 +
c
r
λ1
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1−1(
− yI
y¯∗2
)
r − µ
r
λ1
λ1 − 1
=
τ
r
+
τ
r
(λ1 − 1)
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1
+
1− τ
r
λ1
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1
− c
c+ δ
λ1
r
(
yI
y¯∗
)λ1
. (B.6)
Define F (yI) and G(δ) as:
F (yI) =
(
r
r − µ
)λ1 (λ1 − 1
λ1
)λ1
yλ1I , (B.7.a)
G(δ) =
τ
(τ − λ1)(c+ δ)− cλ1 (c+ δ)
1+λ1 . (B.7.b)
Then, by manipulating the first order condition above, we find that it means that F (yI) = G(δ). Therefore,
we can identify F (y0I ) = G(0) as one point on this curve, which yields
y0I =
(
r − µ
r
λ1
λ1 − 1c
)(
τ
τ − 2λ1
) 1
λ1
. (B.8)
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The point y0I is the point at which the first order condition is solved for δ = 0. Next we work out the total
differential dF (yI) and dG(δ):
dF (yI) =
λ1
yI
F (yI)dyI , (B.9.a)
dG(δ) =
(
1 + λ1
c+ δ
− 1
(c+ δ) + λ1
λ1−τc
)
G(δ)dδ. (B.9.b)
Along the path where F (yI) = G(δ) the relationship dF (yI) = dG(δ) means that
λ1
yI
dyI =
(
1 + λ1
c+ δ
− 1
(c+ δ) + λ1
λ1−τc
)
dδ
and we find therefore the following:
F (yI) = F (y
0
I ) +
∫ yI
y0I
λ1
y
dy = G(0) +
∫ δ
0
(
1 + λ1
c+ δ′
− 1
(c+ δ′) + λ1
λ1−τc
)
dδ′ = G(δ). (B.10)
By eliminating F (y0I ) and G(0) and integrating out, we find:
∫ yI
y0I
−λ1
y
dy =
∫ δ
0
(
(λ1 + 1)
c+ δ′
− 1
(c+ δ′) + λ1
λ1−τ c
)
dδ′, (B.11)
which means
ln
yI
y0I
=
λ1 + 1
λ1
ln
(
1 +
δ
c
)
− 1
λ1
ln
(
1 +
λ1 − τ
2λ1 − τ
δ
c
)
, (B.12)
and Lemma 1 follows. 
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Proof of Proposition 1: Step 1 (Optimal borrowing): From Lemma 1 we have
ln(yI) = ln(y
0
I ) +
λ1 + 1
λ1
ln
(
1 +
δ¯
c
)
− 1
λ1
ln
(
1 +
λ1 − τ
2λ1 − τ
δ¯
c
)
. (B.13)
If δ¯ < 0 then the optimal borrowing policy is δ = 0 (Case 1). If δ¯ ≥ 0 and the assumption that
min
(
ξ 1−τ
r−µ y¯
∗, c
r
)
= ξ 1−τ
r−µ y¯
∗ is true, then δ = δ¯ (Case 2). If the assumption is not true, the value of the old
debt is VB(yI) = cr which is independent of δ, therefore the firm seeks to set δ such as to maximise its value
V¯ (yI), which is also the objective when there is no debt overhang. Therefore, the optimal delta satisfies
the condition that c+ δ =
(
r
r−µ
λ1−1
λ1
)(
τ
−(λ1−1)τ−λ1(1−ξ)(1−τ)
)− 1
λ1 yI .
Step 2 (Smooth pasting condition firm): The firm defaults at y∗, makes the investment at yI , and col-
lects the cash flow −c(1− τ) in the intermediate region where debt service is upheld. The general form of
the equity value function is Ayλ1t +By
λ2
t − cr (1− τ) for arbitrary constants A and B. This function means
that we can write the smooth pasting problem at y∗ as:
M(y∗)
 A
B
−
 cr (1− τ)
0
 =
 0
0
 , (B.14)
and the smooth pasting problem at yI as:
M(yI)
 A
B
−
 cr (1− τ)
0
 =
 V¯ (yI , c)− I − V¯B(yI , c)
V¯ ′(yI , c)− V¯ ′B(yI , c)
 =
 Γ(yI , c, δ)
Γ′(yI , c, δ)
 . (B.15)
By solving for the vector with the coefficients A and B for both problems, and setting the right-hand sides
equal, we achieve the result. 
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Proof of Proposition 2: To make the notation more compact, we use VE(y, c) = V (y, c)− VB(y, c) and
VE(y, 0) = V (y, 0) − VB(y, c). We first investigate the optimal restructuring point from the point of view
of the debt holder.
Step 1 (Sharing): Consider restructuring at y∗ ≤ yˆ ≤ yI such that destructing takes place below yˆL and
above yˆH but not in between (see step 2). Since the debt holder keeps whatever is left of the equity once
the original equity holders receive their outside option, any restructuring solution at yˆ must involve an offer
of VE(yˆ, c) worth of equity to the original equity holders and the debt holder retaining V (yˆ, 0)−VE(yˆ, c) =
VB(yˆ, c) + (V (yˆ, 0)− V (yˆ, c)) worth of equity.
Step 2 (Restructuring region): Any restructuring point below y∗ involves the restructuring of an already
restructured firm in default which is worth ξ percent of the original firm and with no coupon flow, so it is
never desirable for the debt holder that has the option to receive more if it restructures in a non-distressed
state. Any restructuring point above yI involves the restructuring of a firm that has already made the
investment where the restructuring gains are zero. Therefore, all optimal restructuring points yˆ must be
in the interval [y∗, yI ].
Step 3 (Optimal timing): Suppose the debt holder defers the restructuring from above to a point yˆL such
that if yt > yˆL, then the debt holder collects the coupon flow c. Then, at yt = yˆL the debt holder’s claim
is converted into equity where the debt holder collects a fraction, specifically VB(yˆL,c)+(V (yˆL,0)−V (yˆL,c))
V¯ (yˆL,c)
, of
the firm’s earnings flow yt. This fraction decreases with yˆL, so if the debt holder finds that deferment
of the restructuring is optimal at yˆL it also finds that deferment of the restructuring to be optimal at a
point below yˆL in order to receive a greater fraction of the firm’s earnings flow and to keep receiving the
coupon payments of c in the mean time. Therefore, ultimately yˆL is lowered to the point where yˆL = y∗.
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Similarly, the debt holder defers the restructuring from below to a point yˆH such that if yt < yˆH , then the
debt holder collects the coupon flow c and at yt = yˆH the debt holder’s claim is converted into equity. In
this case deferral beyond yI might be desirable but not feasible (Step 2) Therefore, the only problem is to
determine the optimal timing of yˆH . If a smooth pasting solution determines the timing, then it can be
written as:
M(yˆH)
 A
B
+
 cr
0
 =
 VB(yˆH , c) + V (yˆ, 0)− V (yˆH , c)
V ′B(yˆ, c) + V ′(yˆ, 0)− V ′(yˆ, c)
 , (B.17)
where A and B are arbitrary constants. We can solve for these constants:
 A
B
 = M−1
 VB(yˆH , c) + V (yˆ, 0)− V (yˆH , c)− cr
V ′B(yˆ, c) + V ′(yˆ, 0)− V ′(yˆ, c)
 . (B.18)
Also, we know that the debt value at yˆL is given by Ayˆλ1L +Byˆ
λ2
L +
c
r
= V (yˆL, 0), so
(
yˆλ1L yˆ
λ2
L
)
M−1(yˆH)
 VB(yˆH , c) + V (yˆH , 0)− V (yˆH , c)− cr
V ′B(yˆH , c) + V ′(yˆH , 0)− V ′(yˆH , c)
+ cr = V (yˆL, 0), (B.19)
which determines the optimal timing of yˆH . This solution never exceeds yI as beyond this point there are
no efficiency gains from the point of view of the debt holder. What remains is to show that (B.19) yields
(14). To do this we rewrite (B.19) in the following way:
(
yˆλ1L yˆ
λ2
L
)
M−1(yˆH)
 V (yˆH , 0)− cr
V ′(yˆH , c)
− ( yˆλ1L yˆλ2L
)
M−1(yˆH)
 VE(yˆH , c)
V ′E(yˆH , c)
+ cr = V (yˆL, 0).
(B.20)
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Since the equity claim can be written as A′yλ1 +B′yλ2 − c
r
(1− τ) for some constants A′ and B′, we find
(
yˆλ1L yˆ
λ2
L
)
M−1(yˆH)
 V (yˆH , 0)− cr
V ′(yˆH , 0)
− ( yˆλ1L yˆλ2L
)
M−1(yˆH)
 A′yˆλ1H +B′yˆλ2H − cr (1− τ)
λ1A
′yˆλ1−1H + λ2B
′yˆλ2−1H
+ cr
= V (yˆL, c). (B.21)
By combining the terms involving c on the left-hand side, and by working out explicitly the second term
on the left-hand side, we find:
(
yˆλ1L yˆ
λ2
L
)
M−1(yˆH)
 V (yˆH , 0)− cτr
V ′(yˆH , 0)
− ( yˆλ1L yˆλ2L
) A′
B′
+ cr = V (yˆL, 0). (B.22)
Finally, using the fact that the second term on the left hand side reduces to A′yˆλ1L + B
′yˆλ2L = VE(yˆL, c) +
c
r
(1− τ) = c
r
(1− τ) (since the equity value is zero at yˆL = y∗) we find
(
yˆλ1L yˆ
λ2
L
)
M−1(yˆH)
 V (yˆH , 0)− cτr
V ′(yˆH , 0)
 = V (yˆL, 0)− cτr . (B.23)
Recognising that V (yˆH , 0) = Γ(yˆH , 0, δˆ) we obtain equation (14).
Now consider the shareholders’ problem:
Step 1 (Sharing): Consider yˆL ≤ yˆH ≤ yI such that restructuring takes place at yˆL and yˆH but not in
between. Since the firm keeps whatever is left of the equity once the debt holder receives its outside
option, any restructuring solution at yˆ ≥ y∗ must involve an offer of VB(yˆ, c) worth of equity to the original
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debt holder and the remaining V (yˆ, 0)−VB(yˆ, c) worth of equity is retained by the firm. Any restructuring
solution at yˆ < y∗ must involve an offer of ξV (yˆ, 0) worth of equity to the original debt holder and the
remaining (1− ξ)V (yˆ, 0) worth of equity is retained by the firm.
Step 2 (Restructuring region): Any restructuring point strictly below y∗ yields the same sharing of equity
between the debt holder and the firm but will cost the firm coupon payments to achieve. Therefore there
are no gains achievable by deferring the restructuring at yˆ < y∗. Thus, y∗ ≤ yˆL. Any restructuring
point strictly above yI is incentive compatible only if investment is deferred. This is never optimal unless
efficiency gains are achieved, which cannot be true since the only source of inefficiency in this setup is
associated with underinvestment. Therefore yˆH ≤ yI .
Step 3 (Optimal timing): Consider yˆL = y∗ and the smooth pasting problem to determine yˆH . The opti-
mality condition is:
(
yˆλ1L yˆ
λ2
L
)
M−1(yˆH)
 V (yˆH , 0)− VB(yˆH , c) + cr (1− τ)
V ′(yˆH , 0)− V ′B(yˆH , c)
− cr (1− τ) = V (yˆL, 0)− VB(yˆL, c). (B.24)
We show that this problem has the same solution as (14) and therefore solves the timing problem for the
firm. Using the same procedure as above, we isolate the debt values:
(
yˆλ1L yˆ
λ2
L
)
M−1(yˆH)
 V (yˆH , 0) + cr (1− τ)
V ′(yˆH , 0)
− ( yˆλ1L yˆλ2L
)
M−1(yˆH)
 VB(yˆH , c)
V ′B(yˆH , c)
− cr (1− τ)
= V (yˆL, 0)− VB(yˆL, c). (B.25)
The debt value can be written as A′′yλ1 + B′′yλ2 + c
r
for constants A′′ and B′′, so we can reduce further
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the left-hand side to the following:
(
yˆλ1L yˆ
λ2
L
)
M−1(yˆH)
 V (yˆH , 0)− cτr
V ′(yˆH , 0)
− A′′yˆλ1L −B′′yˆλ2L − cr (1− τ) = V (yˆL, 0)− VB(yˆL, c). (B.26)
Since A′′yˆλ1L +B
′′yˆλ2L = VB(yˆL, c)− cr , we ultimately find
(
yˆλ1L yˆ
λ2
L
)
M−1(yˆH)
 V (yˆH , c)− cτr
V ′(yˆH , c)
 = V (yˆL, c)− cτr , (B.27)
which is identical to (B.23). 
Proof of Proposition 3: It suffices to show that a restructuring process that maximises the value of the
firm, that is, the joint value of the firm’s debt and equity, is the same as the restructuring process that
maximises the value of the firm’s debt or equity individually, as outlined in Proposition 3. Therefore, using
the same argument as outlined in the proof of Proposition 3, a restructuring at yˆL = y∗ and yˆH determined
by a smooth pasting program satisfies the condition:
(
yˆλ1L yˆ
λ2
L
)
M−1(yˆH)
 V (yˆH , 0)− V (yˆH , c)
V ′(yˆH , 0)− V ′(yˆH , c)
 = V (yˆL, 0)− V (yˆL, c). (B.28)
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We can write V (y, c) = A′′′yλ1 +B′′′yλ2 + cτ
r
for some constants A′′′ and B′′′, and rewriting (B.28) we find:
(
yˆλ1L yˆ
λ2
L
)
M−1(yˆH)
 V (yˆH , 0)− cτr
V ′(yˆH , 0)
− ( yˆλ1L yˆλ2L
)
M−1(yˆH)
 A′′′yˆλ1L +B′′′yˆλ2L
λ1A
′′′yˆλ1−1L + λ2B
′′′yˆλ2−1L

= V (yˆL, 0)− V (yˆL, c). (B.29)
Using the fact that the second term on the left-hand side equals A′′′yˆλ1L +B
′′′yˆλ2L = V (yˆL, c)− cτr we find:
(
yˆλ1L yˆ
λ2
L
)
M−1(yˆH)
 V (yˆH , 0)− cτr
V ′(yˆH , 0)
− V (yˆL, c) + cτr = V (yˆL, 0)− V (yˆL, c). (B.30)
and this reduces further to equation (B.23). 
Proof of Lemma 2: The first order conditions of the Lagrangian are as follows:
0 =
∂L
∂c
− ϕ1∂K1
∂c
− ϕ2∂K2
∂c
− ϕ3∂K3
∂c
(B.31.a)
0 =
∂L
∂yˆL
− ϕ1∂K1
∂yˆL
− ϕ2∂K2
∂yˆL
− ϕ3∂K3
∂yˆL
(B.31.b)
0 =
∂L
∂yˆH
− ϕ3∂K3
∂yˆH
(B.31.c)
The third condition determines ϕ3:
ϕ3 =
∂L
∂yˆH
1
∂K3/∂yˆH
(B.32)
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This can be substituted into the two first conditions, and we find the system:
 ∂K1/∂c ∂K2/∂c
∂K1/∂yˆL ∂K2/∂yˆL

 ϕ1
ϕ2
 =
 ∂L/∂c− ∂L/∂yˆH ∂K3/∂c∂K3/∂yˆH
∂L/∂yˆL − ∂L/∂yˆH ∂K3/∂yˆL∂K3/∂yˆH
 (B.33)
Pre-multiplying the equation by the inverse of the matrix on the left-hand side isolates ϕ1 and ϕ2. Substi-
tuting these into the first of the first order conditions above yields (18).
We know that we can associate with each c a unique yˆL(c) and yˆH(c) as the solution to (13). Existence
is established by the fact that for a given c and a yˆL ≤ y ≤ yˆH , the objective function characterises the
firm’s value for that borrowing level at the current state variable y. Since the smooth pasting problems
that derive the boundary points have solutions, so must the objective function as the value function is
bounded and continuous in y for a given c. Therefore, a solution exists for every c such that yˆL(c) ≤ yˆH(c).
Maximising over all c must produce a solution within the values of c where yˆL ≤ yˆH(c), since otherwise it
would not be the solution to the smooth pasting problem.
We claim there is a debt level c at which yˆH(c) is maximal, which defines y¯. For c → 0, yˆH(c) must
approach the investment trigger for an unlevered firm. For c→∞ the firm always restructures immediately.
Therefore, there is some c¯ <∞ for which yˆL(c¯) = yˆH(c¯). Since yˆH(c) is finite and continuous between zero
and c¯, a maximum point exists for 0 < c < c¯.
Uniqueness remains. Suppose for a given y, there are two solutions c1 < c2 to the maximisation
problem. This means that L(c1, yˆL(c1), yˆH(c1)|y) = L(c2, yˆL(c2), yˆH(c2)|y) for a given y. This means at
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this particular value of y:
(
yλ1 yλ2
)M−1(yˆH(c1))
 Γ(yˆH(c1), 0, δˆ)− c1τr
Γ′(yˆH(c1), 0, δˆ)
−M−1(yˆH(c2))
 Γ(yˆH(c2), 0, δˆ)− c2τr
Γ′(yˆH(c2), 0, δˆ)


+
(c1 − c2)τ
r
= 0 (B.34)
However, by the assumption that c1 and c2 are optimal the transition from c1 to c2 at the threshold y must
be smooth (by the smooth-pasting principle the firm can jump “smoothly” from one level of borrowing to
the other). Therefore, differentiating (B.34) with respect to y, we should find:
(
λ1y
λ1−1 λ2yλ2−1
)M−1(yˆH(c1))
 Γ(yˆH(c1), 0, δˆ)− c1τr
Γ′(yˆH(c1), 0, δˆ)
−M−1(yˆH(c2))
 Γ(yˆH(c2), 0, δˆ)− c2τr
Γ′(yˆH(c2), 0, δˆ)


= 0 (B.35)
Thus, the only way (B.34) and (B.35) can hold is that the difference between the coefficients inside the
large matrices are both strictly positive, that is:
M−1(yˆH(c1))
 Γ(yˆH(c1), 0, δˆ)− c1τr
Γ′(yˆH(c1), 0, δˆ)
−M−1(yˆH(c2))
 Γ(yˆH(c2), 0, δˆ)− c2τr
Γ′(yˆH(c2), 0, δˆ)

 >
 0
0
 (B.36)
But if the difference is positive, then the value function associated with c1 must be greater than the value
function associated with c2 for all y′ < y and y′ > y, whereas at most one of these can be true. This is a
contradiction. Therefore, there must be a kink in the optimal value function at y which contradicts the
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assumption that two solutions c1 6= c2 exist. 
Proof of Proposition 4: Consider the change y + ∆y along the path where the constraints in (17.a-b)
hold, which means new coupon flow c+ ∆c and associated triggers yˆL + ∆yˆL and yˆH + ∆yˆH . The value of
the equity and debt is then
Equity = L(c+ ∆c, yˆL + ∆yˆL, yˆH + ∆yˆH |y + ∆y)− VB(y + ∆y, c+ ∆c) (B.36.a)
Debt = VB(y + ∆y, c+ ∆c) (B.36.b)
If the firm holds the bargaining power, it offers a fraction κ worth of VB(y + ∆y, c + ∆c) in exchange
for its old claim VB(y + ∆y, c). Since the debt holder must be made equally well off after the debt-for-
debt exchange, it must be the case that κVB(y + ∆y, c + ∆c) = VB(y + ∆y, c). Therefore, the value
of the firm after the exchange is L(c + ∆c, yˆL + ∆yˆL, yˆH + ∆yˆH |y + ∆y) − VB(y + ∆y, c + ∆c) + (1 −
κ)VB(y + ∆y, c + ∆c) = L(c + ∆c, yˆL + ∆yˆL, yˆH + ∆yˆH |y + ∆y) − VB(y + ∆y, c). Therefore, the debt
holder is equally well off and the firm increases its wealth if and only if the firm value is increased.
The Lagrange programme ensures that this increase happens along the path where the constraints Ki,
i = 1, 2, 3, are all equal to zero. If the debt holder holds the bargaining power, it offers the firm κ worth
of L(c+ ∆c, yˆL + ∆yˆL, yˆH + ∆yˆH |y + ∆y)− VB(y + ∆y, c+ ∆c) in exchange for their old claim, and since
the firm must be made equally well off after the exchange it must be the case that κ(L(c + ∆c, yˆL +
∆yˆL, yˆH + ∆yˆH |y + ∆y) − VB(y + ∆y, c + ∆c)) = L(c, yˆL, yˆH |y + ∆y) − VB(y + ∆y, c). The debt holder
retains VB(y + ∆y, c + ∆c) + (1 − κ)(L(c + ∆c, yˆL + ∆yˆL, yˆH + ∆yˆH |y + ∆y) − VB(y + ∆y, c + ∆c)) =
VB(y+ ∆y, c) +L(c+ ∆c, yˆL + ∆yˆL, yˆH + ∆yˆH |y+ ∆y)−L(c, yˆL, yˆH |y+ ∆y). Therefore, the firm is equally
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well off and the debt holder increases its wealth if and only if the firm’s value is increased. Therefore, a
continuous sequence of exchanges can implement value maximisation along the path where the constraints
Ki = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, are satisfied.
Any profitable deviation from the path along which the constraints Ki = 0, i = 1, 2, 3 must therefore
involve violations of one or more of these constraints. Any deviation of this kind will not influence the
ultimate investment trigger point y¯ as long as it returns to the path where Ki = 0 before the firm chooses to
invest. If it does not, the firm’s value is not maximised in the neighbourhood of the new investment trigger
point and therefore not incentive compatible. Thus, we can reduce the analysis of deviations to those that
ultimately return to the path Ki = 0, i = 1, 2, 3 before the investment trigger point is influenced. Consider
such a deviation where for y1 ≤ y ≤ y2 the coupon flow is maintained at c∗(y) + ∆c, where y1 > 0 and
y2 < yˆH(c
∗(y2) + ∆c) (the latter condition ensures that the deviation reverts to the optimal path before
the investment is triggered). Suppose the debt holder holds the bargaining power, and consider that the
deviation is followed by side payments of (1 − τ)∆c from the debt holders to the firm. The net cost to
the firm is then zero: it pays ∆c extra coupon payments to the debt holders but can claim τ percent in
tax relief, and it receives (1 − τ)∆c from the debt holders in side payments. At the same time, the debt
holder receives ∆c from the firm in extra coupon payments but pays (1 − τ)∆c in side payments, which
adds τ∆c in net coupon payments to the debt holder. If ∆c > 0, therefore, then the debt holder is better
off whereas the firm is equally well off. Consider the case where the firm holds the bargaining power and
that the debt holder pays side payments of ∆c to the firm. The net cash flow benefit to the firm is the
difference between ∆c and ∆c(1 − τ), which is τ∆c. For ∆c > 0, the firm is therefore strictly better off
whereas the debt holder is equally well off.
By the assumptions of the model cash payments are not allowed. Compensation equivalent to the side
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payments needs to be generated within the game itself. Any period of over payments ∆c > 0 must be
matched by periods of under payments, but such under payments are never incentive compatible. There-
fore, a deviation involving ∆c > 0 always is harmful to the firm and beneficial to the debt holder and
therefore never incentive compatible for the firm. 
Derivation of Equation (21): The valuation of debt takes the form Ayλ1 + Byλ2 + c
r
where A and
B are constants. The parameters λ1 and λ2 are given in Appendix A. Since the debt holder must have
an incentive to hold the debt at the entry trigger point yE the debt value must be constant along the
boundary. Therefore λ1Ayλ1−1E +λ2By
λ2−1
E = 0. Next, since the debt holder must have an incentive to also
hold the debt also at the exit trigger yB, the drift in the debt value must exactly offset the expected cost
of default, so V¯ ′B(yB, δ) = λ1Ay
λ1−1
B + λ2y
λ2−1
B =
dqt
qt
V¯B(yB, δ). Fries et al. (1997) show that dqtqt =
κ
yB
, and
therefore the coefficients A and B are defined by the system:
 λ1yλ1−1E λ2yλ2−1E
λ1y
λ1−1
B λ2y
λ2−1
B

 A
B
 =
 0
κ
yB
(Ayλ1B +By
λ2
B +
c
r
)
 (B.37)
Multiplying the first row by yE and the second row by yB, and rearranging, we find:
 A
B
 =
 λ1yλ1E λ2yλ2E
(λ1 − κ)yλ1B (λ2 − κ)yλ2B

−1 0
κc
r
 (B.38)
Substituting the coefficients into the valuation formula for V¯B(y, δ) equation (21) follows. 
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